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Abstract
With the introduction of advanced driving assistance systems managing longitudinal and lateral control, conditional auto-
mated driving is seemingly in near future of series vehicles. While take-over behavior in the passenger car context has 
been investigated intensively in recent years, publications on semi-trucks with professional drivers are sparse. The effects 
influencing expert drivers during take-overs in this context lack thorough investigation and are required to design systems 
that facilitate safe take-overs. While multiple findings seem to cohere in passenger cars and semi-trucks, these findings rely 
on simulated studies without taking environments as found in the real world into account. A test track study was conducted, 
simulating highway driving with 27 professional non-affiliated truck drivers. The participants drove an automated Level 3 
semi-truck while a non-driving-related task was available. Multiple time critical take-over situations were initiated during 
the drives to investigate four main objectives regarding driver behavior. (1) With these results, comparison of reaction times 
and behavior can be drawn to previous simulator studies. The effect of situation criticality (2) and training (3) of take-over 
situations is investigated. (4) The influence of warning expectation on driver behavior is explored. Results obtained displayed 
very quick time to hands on steering and time to first reaction all under 2.4 s. Highly critical situations generate very quick 
reaction times M = 0.81 s, while the manipulation of expectancy yielded no significant variation in reaction times. These 
reaction times serve as a reference of what can be expected from drivers under optimal take-over conditions, with quick 
reactions at high speed in critical situations.
Keywords Conditional automated driving · Truck drivers · Driver take-over · Test-track study · Warning expectancy
1 Introduction
The term ‘automated driving’ has become a global discus-
sion point in recent years, with political and social inter-
ests rising to develop vehicles enabling automation. While 
the progress has been significant within the past decade, 
complete automation of the driving task has not yet been 
achieved. Of late, new assistance systems are entering 
the market to support drivers in restricted scenarios such 
as Audi’s traffic jam pilot (Audi 2017), Tesla’s Autopilot 
(Tesla 2019) and the Mercedes Active Drive Assist for 
trucks (Daimler 2018). These systems rank as Level 2 partial 
automation and Level 3 conditional automated driving (SAE 
J3016 2018). Especially for Level 3, the difficulty of transi-
tions between machine and driver is an ongoing research 
field, in which the system reaches limits and the driver needs 
to regain control of the vehicle in short timeframes (Young 
et al. 2007). Research within the field of automation tran-
sitions has shown that human capabilities can deteriorate 
due to task switching (Bainbridge 1983; Wylie et al. 2000) 
and a lack of situation awareness (Endsley 1995; Young 
et al. 2002). These effects also apply to advanced assistance 
systems in vehicles (Brookhuis et al. 2001; de Winter et al. 
2014). If these theoretical constructs apply to the vehicles 
with advanced driver assistance systems, the question that 
is at the core of ongoing research is: how long do driv-
ers require to regain control of vehicles safely (Gold et al. 
2013)?
 * Alexander Lotz 
 rene_alexander.lotz@daimler.com
 Nele Russwinkel 
 nele.russwinkel@tu-berlin.de
1 Daimler Truck AG, Stuttgart, Germany
2 Technische Universität Berlin, Marchstr. 23, Sekr. MAR 3-2, 
10587 Berlin, Germany
734 Cognition, Technology & Work (2020) 22:733–744
1 3
The truck context does not contain the amount of pub-
lications as the passenger car context does for Level 3, as 
studies of take-over are often limited to instances without 
high time–pressure (Zhang et al. 2017). The effect of learn-
ing take-over situations (Lotz et al. 2019b), the influence of 
accustoming to a new automation function in experimental 
contexts and reacting to a new warning are influcences that 
have been investigated sporadicly in recent years (Kantowitz 
et al. 2009) and will be the main topic of the present study. 
Recent research by the ADAS&ME project also addressed 
the specific issue of developing new driver monitoring sys-
tems to adjust human–machine interface content in the truck 
on the basis of driver needs (Axelson et al. 2018). This is 
important as most participants engage with the different 
automation functions for the first time in published research 
and in most studies only a handful of take-over situations are 
presented. Distinguishing underlying human capabilities that 
can or cannot adjust over time is paramount.
The aims of the present study are to investigate the 
behavior of semi-truck drivers in a prototypic vehicle in 
quasi real-world Level 3 automation on a test track. This 
will allow insight into driver behavior outside of simu-
lated environments and possibly generate other results as 
previously determined. Different take-over situations will 
be investigated that vary in criticality to determine possi-
ble differences in driver behavior at take-over when a non-
driving-related task (NDRT) is performed. The occasion of 
these take-overs will also be controlled, to investigate the 
effect of take-over expectancy. The following introductory 
sections focus on the current state of research of reaction 
times in critical take-over situation (Sect. 1.1), the effect of 
expected warnings (Sect. 1.2), the resulting aims of the study 
(Sect. 1.3), the definition of reaction times (Sect. 1.4) and 
hypotheses (Sect. 1.5).
1.1  Reaction times in critical take‑over situations
Multiple studies have investigated reaction times in recent 
years, primarily in fixed and moving-base simulators 
(McDonald et al. 2019). Results indicate a large variation in 
reaction times ranging between 3 to 8 s according to Vogel-
pohl et al. (2016) and with an average reaction time until 
control is regained of M = 2.96 s (SD = 1.96 s) (Eriksson 
et al. 2017). As pointed out rightly by Zeeb et al. (2015), it 
does not seem as though reaction times are comparable due 
to the large variance in influencing factors that have been 
categorized into clusters by Vogelpohl et al. (2016): driver, 
environmental, vehicle and human–machine interaction fac-
tors. All of these studies mentioned were conducted within 
the passenger car context. A study of time critical take-overs 
during Level 3 driving in the truck context provided dis-
tinctly quicker reaction times with 99.7% (3σ-Interval) of 
755 take-overs ranging between 0 s and 2.82 s (Lotz et al. 
2019b). A possible explanation for these quick reaction 
times could be that within the truck context drivers are pro-
fessionals, with far more experience controlling a vehicle, 
higher mileage, and daily repetition. Surprising critical take-
over situations seem to reduce the reaction times also in the 
car context, as Diederichs et al. (2015) determine a reduc-
tion of 200 ms compared to expected take-overs. Previous 
work also investigated the possibility of predicting reaction 
times based on vehicle sensor data and a driver monitor-
ing system (Lotz et al. 2019a). Limited predictability was 
achieved due to restricted data and low variance between 
prediction classes. A comparison study between the pas-
senger car context and truck context investigating the dif-
ference in reactions has not been conducted to the best of 
the authors’ knowledge. The detailed analysis of current 
publications also presents the difficulty of comparability of 
results, as experimental design and measures vary through-
out all studies.
1.2  Expected warnings and impact of trained 
transitions
Research on advanced driver assistance systems of Level 2 
(SAE J3016 2018) has shown that reaction times to start a 
motoric response is influenced by the expectation of an event 
occurring (Ruscio et al. 2015). However, while an unex-
pected situation arose in the abovementioned experimental 
real-life study, differences in criticality were not investigated. 
In addition, repetition of unforeseen events has thus far not 
been conducted, eliminating the possibility of observing 
learning of such situations (Kantowitz et al. 2009). Melcher 
et al. (2015) investigate an identical take-over situation while 
varying integration of a NDRT and automated braking. Prior 
learning of requests to intervene (RtI) has displayed posi-
tive effects on take-over performance. Additionally, the trust 
in automation seems to increase after an adequate stage in 
which drivers can accustom to a new function (Hergeth et al. 
2016). Further research on false warnings has also shown 
that false warnings can affect subsequent reactions nega-
tively (Lees et al. 2007). Therefore, an unanswered research 
question that arises is ‘how learning of expected situations, 
not warnings, and the criticality of these take-overs may 
affect reaction times’? We thereby differentiate training from 
expectation. While we define the expectancy towards a take-
over situation as the current state of the driver anticipating a 
take-over situation will arise within a short timeframe. This 
assumption by the driver is formed based on the surround-
ing of the vehicle, explicitly the approaching towards a steep 
curve in this study as described in Sect. 2.2. The opposing 
construct of training is the effect of improving take-over 
procedure through learning. While this study entails aspects 
of task switching and the current identification of situation 
awareness, these constructs will not be measured explicitly.
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1.3  Scope of study
The scope of the present study can be categorized into two 
main aspects.
1. A test-track study in a prototype vehicle providing the 
possibility of Level 3 automation with critical take-overs 
is investigated. By allowing participants to drive on a 
high-speed oval test-track with traffic, highly realistic 
highway scenarios are investigated with a prototypic 
vehicle rather than utilizing a simulator. This allows 
a comparison to previous simulator results regarding 
driver behavior for critical take-over situations for truck 
drivers. Additionally, possible shortcomings of simula-
tor studies such as motion sickness and driving comfort 
as mentioned by Bellem et al. (2016) can be largely dis-
regarded for the results of this study. Finally, traffic on 
the test track increases comparability to real-world driv-
ing on highways, as driver’s are inclined to observe their 
surroundings during automation due to real rather than 
simulated vehicles. This generates important behavioral 
data regarding real-world take-over reactions. Due to 
safety regulations on the test track, no obstacles could 
be tossed in front of the vehicles at such high velocities 
with surrounding vehicles. Criticality, therefore, was 
induced through fictive malfunction of the automation 
function, i.e., by prompting a lateral steering swerve 
maneuver.
2. The test scenario intends to display two different take-
over warnings throughout the drive resulting in three 
different take-over situation types. While all warning 
types are introduced in a preparatory tutorial phase, only 
the take-over type with the lowest criticality, in which 
these warnings will be initiated, is trained. This will lead 
to a discrepancy between learned behavior for different 
warnings and the current take-over situation witnessed. 
It is to be expected that this discrepancy causes differ-
ences in reaction times as explained in Sect. 2.2.5 and 
to adjust due to learning throughout the drives.
1.4  Reaction time definition
The reaction times collected within this study are defined 
in accordance with the work of Damböck (2013). Common 
take-over quality measures such as lateral variance in trajec-
tory after take-over will not be reported, as precise localiza-
tion was not possible in the prototype vehicle.
Time to eyes on road (TTEoR): the time from the begin-
ning of the auditory and visual warning until the first fixation 
is started within the windscreen area of interest. This serves 
as a measure for cognitive processing and visual reaction.
Time to hands on steering (TTHoS): the time is defined 
from the beginning of the auditory and visual warning until 
hands touch the steering wheel for the first time. The meas-
ure expresses the motoric reaction time needed for the driver 
to regain the possibility of intervening in the lateral control 
of the vehicle.
Time to first reaction (TTFR): two thresholds are moni-
tored to define the minimal reaction time measure. The 
minimum of the time required for pressing the ac-/decel-
erator pedal more than 5% or applying more than 1 Nm at 
the steering wheel defines the TTFR. The metric allows for 
the interpretation of the time required by a driver to form a 
situation awareness and plan a route to circumvent possible 
obstacles in the trajectory of a vehicle.
1.5  Hypotheses
Based on the aims of the study in Sect.1.3, the following 
hypotheses are generated. While the data entail far more 
information, the study aims are reduced to the following 
four hypotheses.
1. Take-over situations of higher criticality will promote 
quicker first reactions (TTFR), see Sect. 1.4  for defini-
tion. This does not include the time to hands on steering 
(TTHoS) which will be constant for all take-over situa-
tions.
2. A reaction to expected situations will occur quicker than 
to unexpected situations, so long the criticality is similar. 
This is because reactions towards expected situations 
can be planned prior to the warning itself. Expected and, 
therefore, anticipated take-over situations will yield no 
difference in reaction times.
3. Reaction times will be within a similar scope to the 
results obtained in the previous simulator study (Lotz 
et al. 2019b). The magnitude of the average time to first 
reaction will be under 2 s for highly critical take-over 
situations with a NDRT.
4. The engagement in the NDRT will cause the TTFR to 
be slower if the NDRT is not addressed.
2  Methods
2.1  Participants
A total of 27 participants were recruited through direct 
inquiry at 60 hauler and logistic firms. Participation was 
voluntary; all participants were professional truck drivers, 
receiving a financial incentive. Seven participants were 
excluded from the data analysis due to technical synchro-
nization failures of the eye-tracker with the vehicle data 
and one participant mentioning discomfort driving with the 
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automated function. The experiment could be terminated 
at any point in time and all participants gave an informed 
consent to the experiment. It was explained in detail that 
the truck was fitted with a prototypic function and warn-
ings, which could arise at any moment in time. Physical 
wellbeing was addressed and queried prior to the start of 
the experiment and monitored during procedure. In addition, 
the experimental design underwent an internal audit by an 
ethical steering committee.
The remaining 20 participants were all male with a mean 
age of M = 47.1 years (SD = 12.0 years) and reached an aver-
age annual mileage of 63,770 km/year (SD = 38,732 km/
year). A self-estimated 32.3% of the annual mileage was 
spent on highways, 42.0% were driven on overland roads, 
and the remaining 25.7% was driving in urban settings. In 
the sample of this study, one participant was not familiar 
with speedometers or adaptive cruise control, while over 
90% used these systems daily.
2.2  Apparatus
2.2.1  Vehicle
A Mercedes-Benz Actros 1845 including a prototypic auto-
mation function enabling Level 3 on highways was provided 
for all drives. Controls of the automation function were iden-
tical to that of the series Active Drive Assist (Daimler 2018), 
on the right-hand side of the steering wheel. The automation 
function was engaged through the ‘Set’ button to the current 
speed and could be toggled to the desired speed through plus 
or minus controls. The second option of engaging the auto-
mation function was initiated through the ‘Resume’ button, 
reactivating the previously set speed, see Fig. 1. Automa-
tion could be terminated at any moment in time through the 
‘OFF’-button.
Once Level 3 driving was activated, the vehicle con-
trolled the lateral and longitudinal maneuvering, kept the 
vehicle within lane markings, and decelerated if obstacles 
appeared ahead. Lateral control required the input of lane 
markings to a camera and a radar provided objects in the 
surroundings, to brake accordingly. Braking was not nec-
essary within the experimental setting, as the truck was the 
slowest vehicle on the test track. All surrounding vehicles 
were steered by drivers with safety training.
2.2.2  Track
All participants were invited to the automotive testing 
ground in Papenburg, Germany (ATP Automotive Test-
ing Papenburg GmbH 2018) and instructed on all safety 
regulations. The testing ground includes a high-speed oval 
with a length of 12.3 km and five lanes for simulated high-
way driving. Due to regulations on the track, the minimal 
driving speed was 90 km/h, which all drivers followed 
during the drives. The Level 3 driving was only initial-
ized on the 4-km-long straights, while the steep curves 
were driven manually on the lowest lane. The study was 
conducted in December, which included quickly changing 
weather including sunshine, heavy rain, strong winds, and 
overcast skies.
2.2.3  Eye‑tracker
Gaze behavior was tracked through a Smart Eye Pro eye-
tracker. Mounted on the dashboard, four lenses were dis-
persed around the driver to monitor gazes into the wind-
screen, onto the tablet, into the instrument cluster and 
towards both rear-view mirrors. The system was utilized to 
record the visual attention towards a non-driving-related task 
during procedure. The sampling rate was 60 Hz.
Fig. 1  (Left) Cockpit overview with Smart Eye Pro eye-tracker and mounted tablet. Right: details of automation controls on the steering wheel 
and the tablet providing the non-driving-related task (NDRT)
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2.2.4  Non‑driving‑related tasks (NDRT)
During activation of the automation function, interaction 
with NDRT was available. Participants were not encour-
aged to attend the NDRT, to allow them to allocate atten-
tion freely. This resulted in some drivers not attending the 
NDRT throughout Level 3 automation. The affected trails 
were handled separately during data analysis.
The NDRT was based on a previously developed interac-
tive geography quiz (Lotz et al. 2019b). A contoured map of 
Germany was displayed on a mounted tablet in the central 
console, see Fig. 1. The task consisted of locating cities on 
the map by setting coordinates through touch. Chosen spe-
cifically to engage participants for longer periods and allow 
non-fluent speakers to interact in a quiz, this task proved as 
highly engaging in previous studies. To interact with the 
NDRT, visual and motoric attention was required. Through 
the new environment, the possibility of driving a highly 
automated vehicle, the necessity to drive manually in the 
curves and the novel test track environment for each partici-
pant, we are confident that passive fatigue did not occur, as 
discussed by Marberger et al. (2018). However, this was not 
controlled and will not be addressed further.
2.2.5  Take‑over situations and warnings
Three different take-over situations were investigated in the 
present study with varying time criticality. In each situation 
type, one of two optical–acoustic warnings was presented. 
One possible combination was not tested; this resulted in 
three take-over situations: (1) yellow warning with low situ-
ation criticality, (2) red warning with low situation critical-
ity, and (3) red warning with high situation criticality. A 
yellow warning was only presented at the end of a straight 
and red warnings could appear at any moment due to system 
limits being breached.
1. Yellow take-over situation: at the end of each straight, a 
yellow take control warning with a 10-s countdown was 
displayed in the instrument cluster. The warning con-
sisted of a periodical tone with 200 bpm at 1200 Hz with 
a yellow icon in the instrument cluster, see (4) in Fig. 2. 
As Level 3 was not available in the track’s steep turns, 
this automatic prompt was always displayed. To let the 
drivers accustom to the vehicle and surroundings, this 
warning was not displayed on Straight #1. The reason for 
the yellow warning due to the steep curves was provided 
to all participants. The yellow warning was, therefore, 
repetitive and could be expected by participants. The 
criticality was low, as there were more than 10 s until the 
steep curve began. Participants were instructed to turn 
off the automation function and continue driving manu-
ally when the yellow warning was displayed throughout 
the complete curve and reactivate automation on the fol-
lowing straight.
• Yellow warning: occurring at the end of straights as 
an indication to regain manual control with at least 
10 s headway. The vehicle continued on its trajectory 
with no perceivable increased criticality.
2. Red take-over situation: consisted of a red take control 
warning presented when the vehicle reached system 
limits and a continuous tone at 1200 Hz occurred, see 
(5) in Fig. 2. Participants were instructed to take back 
control of the vehicle as soon as possible when this sig-
nal appeared, as the system reached its limit. The red 
warning was presented multiple times during Level 3 
activation, see Fig. 3. The automation function regis-
tered the take-over at the steering wheel upon which the 
warning terminated instantly. Participants did not need 
to deactivate the function with the ‘OFF’-button. Addi-
tionally, the final yellow warning on Straight #9 was 
substituted with this red take-over warning, to investi-
gate the response towards switched warning types and, 
Fig. 2  Automation system warnings in the instrument cluster between 
speedometer and rev counter. Left to right: (1) automation available 
and ready for activation. (2) Automation function activated as sym-
bolized through blue ‘HP’ symbol. (3) Activation function passive 
due to oversteering by participants. (4) Yellow warning at the end of 
all straights with a 10-s counter. (5) Red warning advising immediate 
take control (color figure online)
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therefore, an unexpected warning signal with identical 
criticality
• Red warning: occurring anywhere on the straights 
with the instruction to regain control as quickly as 
possible. The vehicle continued on its trajectory with 
no perceivable increased criticality.
3. Lane twitch take-over situation: instead of warning with-
out seeming environmental reason and low criticality, a 
rapid trajectory change was induced to generate a take-
over situation with high criticality and the red warn-
ing was displayed. This warning was only induced on 
the straights without the need to regain manual control 
immediately in front of steep curve, due to safety rea-
sons. This take-over type is referred to as a lane twitch 
hereon.
• Red warning and lane twitch: occurring during auto-
mation anywhere on the straights with the instruction 
to regain control as quickly as possible. The vehicle 
trajectory changed rapidly to increase criticality.
The trajectory change induced resulted in a steering 
wheel angle change (M = 18.68°, SD = 2.81°) to the right, 
a track offset (M = 0.21 m, SD = 0.12 m) and lateral accel-
eration (M = 0.60 m/s2, SD = 0.25 m/s2). A safety engineer 
seated on the rear seat behind the participants observed traf-
fic in the rear-view mirrors and did not start the take-over if 
vehicles were within the proximity.
2.3  Procedure
After completing all safety introductions participants filled 
out a socio-demographic questionnaire, the automation func-
tion and NDRT were described and one lap on the test track 
as a passenger was completed. During all drives, one safety 
engineer was present in the vehicle and an additional experi-
menter guided the participants through the tutorial and drive. 
During the introductory lap, the automation function was not 
shown; however, the controls were clarified at the steering 
wheel and function-related questions were answered. The 
participants had no specific instructions for the drive other 
than to experience a prototypic automation function nov-
ices but with a professional background and high driving 
experience.
Participants were in control of the vehicle for five laps 
(Straight #0–#9), of which the first two laps consisted of a 
guided tutorial to accustom to the automation function. The 
automation function was initiated on Straight #1 for the first 
time, see Fig. 3. Drivers could overrule the function at any 
time by pressing the ac-/decelerator pedals or guiding the 
vehicle laterally with the steering wheel without turning the 
automation function off, see (3) in Fig. 2. While the automa-
tion function was being overruled, the function was passive 
and reinitiated itself upon terminating the overruling. Dur-
ing the first four straights, the participants experienced a 
total of seven take-overs (three yellow, four red), see Fig. 3. 
The first red take-over warning on each straight during the 
tutorial phase was always announced prior to the take-over. 
On Straight #3, the NDRT was activated the first time and 
the red warning symbol was displayed on the tablet during 
the request to intervene. The yellow take-over situation was 
announced in the tutorial phase to accustom participants to 
turn off the Level 3 automation when approaching the steep 
curves.
The actual experiment phase began with the approach 
onto Straight #4. The participants drove one of two sce-
narios in the experiment phase in which the red and lane 
twitch take-overs on Straight #4, #7 and #8 were reversed, 
see Fig. 3. The reversal of the two scenarios was aimed at 
investigating the influence of the tutorial phase on known 
take-over scenarios, red take-over, and unknown critical 
take-overs, lane twitch, directly after the tutorial phase. The 
order of the time critical take-overs is depicted in Fig. 3 for 
both scenarios (V1 and V2). The participants activated the 
automation function at the beginning of each straight and the 
NDRT was unlocked. The five laps were completed within 
approximately 45 min. Due to the fact that sunset was at 
16:15 (4:15 pm); it was possible to collect data in the early 
phases of night as two drives started after 16:30 (4:30 pm) 
each day.
Fig. 3  Overview of the procedure of participants with the chronology 
of take-over types during Level 3. Three different take-over situations 
were presented: yellow, red and twitch (lane twitch) scenarios. The 
procedure was completely identical except for the take-over situations 
on Straight #4, #7 and #8 in which each driver drove either variant V1 
or V2 (color figure online)
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3  Results
The study design is a within-subject design with repeated 
measures resulting in 356 take-overs. The vehicle data, 
eye-tracking and video recordings were synchronised 
and analyzed with respect to the formulated hypotheses 
of Sect. 1.5. Due to the fact that the prototypic vehicle 
was not fitted with a capacitive steering wheel, the time 
to hands on steering (TTHoS) were evaluated from a syn-
chronised video of the drives. For the time to first reaction 
(TTFR), the threshold of 1 Nm at the steering wheel or 
5% ac- or decelerator pedal position change was defined.
Figure 4 depicts TTFR for both phases of the drive 
(tutorial/experimental) for each take-over situation type, 
when drivers had their hands off the steering wheel. For 
the experimental phase, all reaction times are documented 
in Table 1. On average during the experiment phase, this 
resulted in a TTFR (M = 1.087 s, SD = 0.417 s), TTHoS 
(M = 0.727 s, SD = 0.253 s), and TTEoR (M = 0.364 s, 
SD = 0.425 s) for a total of 162 take-overs in which the 
hands were off the steering. An analysis of all take-overs 
through a full factorial ANOVA with factor phase (tuto-
rial, experiment), situation type (yellow, red, lane twitch), 
hands on steering (true, false), and daytime (day, night) 
was conducted for TTFR and TTHoS. The results of 
both ANOVA are presented in Table 2. An overview of 
the quickest and slowest reaction times is also given in 
Table 1. For some considered take-over situations of situ-
ation type yellow and red, TTEoR and TTFR of 0 s were 
recorded. This displays take-over situations in which the 
driver had their eyes on the road and was not engaging 
in the secondary task. For the yellow situation types this 
TTEoR was 0 s in 33 take-overs, while in the red situa-
tion types this only occurred once, displaying anticipation 
of a take-over situation. Even the maximal outliers dis-
play very quick reaction times for all take-over situations. 
Notably, the maximum TTEoR are slower than TTFR and 
TTHoS. This can be attributed to drivers focusing on the 
instrument cluster with the hands already being placed on 
the steering. The analysis of both the TTFR and TTHoS 
portrays that there is a significant effect of drive phase in 
Fig. 4  Left: time to first reaction (TTFR) in the tutorial and experi-
mental phase when hands were not guiding the steering wheel 
for each different warning type (i.e., yellow, red and red, and lane-
twitch). Right: time to first reaction (TTFR) for the two different ver-
sions with respect to the first take-over compared to all other take-
overs of the same situation type (color figure online)
Table 1  Time to first reaction, time to hands on steering and eyes on road in experiment phase
Minimum, maximum, and average times are reported
Situation type # of take-overs Time to first reaction (s) Time to hands on steering (s) Time to eyes on road (s)
Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg
Yellow 67 0 2.31 M = 1.222 (SD = 0.403) 0.06 1.65 M = 0.705 (SD = 0.300) 0 2.28 M = 0.324 (SD = 0.449)
Red 53 0 2.31 M = 1.109 (SD = 0.469) 0.36 1.56 M = 0.772 (SD = 0.244) 0 2.01 M = 0.496 (SD = 0.469)
Lane Twitch 42 0.36 1.58 M = 0.841 (SD = 0.233) 0.36 1.56 M = 0.705 (SD = 0.173) 0 0.78 M = 0.262 (SD = 0.267)
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the data, this is to be expected as drivers were instructed 
and novices in the tutorial phase. If the hands of the driver 
were on the steering, this resulted in a highly significant 
main effect for both reaction times. A small effect is regis-
tered for the factor criticality (yellow/red vs. lane twitch), 
while the expectancy (yellow vs. red) yielded no effect for 
TTFR. Three further mild interaction effects were identi-
fied for TTFR. These results lead to a rejection of Hypoth-
esis #1, as no clear indication of expectancy and critical-
ity is identified for TTFR. Contrarily, a highly significant 
main effect for expectancy (yellow vs. red warning) was 
identified for TTHoS, while the data did not display any 
significant differences for criticality, see Table 2.
As participants drove one of two versions, see Sect. 2.3, 
a version comparison was conducted for the first take-
overs in comparison to all other take-overs in the experi-
mental phase. The comparison aims to identify whether 
the novel situation lane-twich (M = 0.807, SD = 0.118) 
caused prolonged TTFR compared to all other lane-
twitches (M = 0.725, SD = 0.340), see Fig. 4. As the red 
warning was learned in the tutorial phase participants were 
familiar with this situation type. Due to unequal sample 
Table 2  Results of full-factorial ANOVA for TTFR and TTHoS
Dependent variable Measure Sum of squares df Mean square F Pr (> F) Partial 2
Time to first reaction Phase 12.59 1 12.59 43.43 1.69e-10 0.114167
Expectancy 0.93 1 0.93 3.203 0.07441 0.009414
Criticality 2.60 1 2.60 8.974 0.00294 0.025939
Hands on steering 34.91 1 34.91 120.5  < 2e16 0.263357
Daytime 0.00 1 0.00 0.016 0.90028 0.000047
Phase * expectancy 0.08 1 0.08 0.280 0.59711 0.000830
Phase * hands on steering 3.15 1 3.15 10.87 0.00108 0.031260
Expectancy * hands on steering 2.16 1 2.16 7.441 0.00671 0.021603
Criticality * hands on steering 0.03 1 0.03 0.106 0.74553 0.000313
Phase * daytime 0.29 1 0.29 0.998 0.31843 0.002954
Expectancy * Daytime 0.22 1 0.22 0.752 0.386601 0.002252
Criticality * Daytime 0.00 1 0.00 0.000 0.98561 9.67e-07
Hands on steering * daytime 3.84 1 3.84 13.25 0.00032 0.037824
Phase * expectancy * hands on steering 0.04 1 0.04 0.135 0.71391 0.000399
Phase * expectancy * daytime 0.00 1 0.00 0.006 0.93690 0.000019
Phase * hands on steering * daytime 0.36 1 0.36 1.243 0.26563 0.003676
Expectancy * hands on steering * daytime 0.21 1 0.21 0.716 0.39822 0.002119
Phase * expectancy * hands on S.* daytime 0.00 1 0.00 0.000 0.99852 1.02e-08
Time to hands on steering Phase 1.288 1 1.288 19.985 1.07e-05 0.055982
Expectancy 4.509 1 4.509 69.968 1.62e-15 0.171925
Criticality 0.013 1 0.013 0.204 0.6517 0.000605
Hands on steering 27.29 1 27.29 423.51  < 2e-16 0.556880
Daytime 0.339 1 0.339 5.260 0.0224 0.015368
Phase * expectancy 0.015 1 0.015 0.226 0.6347 0.000671
Phase * hands on steering 0.156 1 0.156 2.414 0.1212 0.007113
Expectancy * hands on steering 0.028 1 0.019 0.295 0.5132 0.001270
Criticality * hands on steering 0.010 1 0.010 0.162 0.6877 0.000480
Phase * daytime 0.003 1 0.003 0.040 0.8418 0.000118
Expectancy * daytime 0.009 1 0.009 0.143 0.7052 0.000425
Criticality * daytime 0.000 1 0.000 0.005 0.9463 0.000014
Hands on steering * daytime 0.062 1 0.062 0.956 0.3289 0.002828
Phase * expectancy * hands on steering 0.000 1 0.000 0.000 0.9988 7.04e-09
Phase * expectancy * daytime 0.028 1 0.028 0.439 0.5082 0.001300
Phase * hands on steering * daytime 0.001 1 0.001 0.012 0.9144 0.000034
Expectancy * hands on steering * daytime 0.001 1 0.001 0.011 0.9153 0.000034
Phase * expectancy * hands on S.* Daytime 0.004 1 0.001 0.056 0.8137 0.000165
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size homoscedasticity was tested through a levene test with 
factors situation type and the binary factor first take-over 
or all others for the dependent variable TTFR. As homo-
scedasticity was not achieved F(3,65) = 2.63, p = 0.058, a 
Welch test was performed displaying significance only for 
situation type F(1,65) = 17.617, p <  < 0.001. The results 
display no difference with respect to first appearance of 
take-over situations, showing that the highly critical lane 
twitch situation was attended unconditional of novelty. 
With respect to the red situation type, non-significant 
results strengthen the assumption that learning of take-
over procedure in the tutorial phase was effective.
Similarly, on the last straight of the experimental phase 
(Straight #9), drivers experienced a different expected 
warning, a red take-over warning was displayed instead 
of a yellow warning. Figure 5 (left) depicts the TTFR 
for all yellow warnings on Straight #8 compared to the 
novel red warning at the end of Straight #9. A two-way 
ANOVA for TTFR was calculated with the categorical 
variable whether hands were touching the steering or not 
and the situation type. This resulted in a significant effect 
for hands on steering F(1,36) = 18.67, p = 0.0002, par-
tial-2  = 0.329, but not for situation type F(1,36) = 0.349, 
p = 0.558, partial-2  = 0.0091.
Also in Fig.  5 (right), TTFR is presented for the 
three different situation types and whether participants 
engaged in the NDRT within 2 s prior to RtI. Engage-
ment was determined through eye-tracking data and if 
the tablet was touched within this timeframe. A one-way 
ANOVA for NDRT engagement was calculated for TTFR 
with no significant effect, F(1,162) = 0.004, p = 0.948, 
partial-2  = 0.00002.
4  Discussion
Multiple research questions are addressed in the present 
study concerning take-over behavior of professional truck 
drivers in Level 3 automation. Test track drives, simulating 
highway scenarios, with non-affiliated professional truck 
drivers were investigated to identify reactions towards dif-
ferent warning types and criticalities resulting in take-over 
situations. The information gathered is paramount to design 
future driver assistance systems, enhance usefulness (DIN 
EN ISO 9241-210:2010 2010) and apply a human-centered 
design approach (Cooley 1982). A positive byproduct of 
applying this knowledge to the design process of future sys-
tems is to achieve the goal of reducing workload on drivers 
and therein decrease accidents.
4.1  Take‑over criticality
One of the prime focuses of this study was to identify 
driver behavior for varying critical take-over situations in 
a real vehicle. The statistical analysis of TTFR displayed a 
mildly significant effect of the two levels of take-over criti-
cality, while TTHoS was constant for this factor. Critical-
ity was manipulated by inducing a steering impulse in the 
high condition, causing the steering wheel to swerve to the 
right when drivers were occupied with a NDRT and hands 
were not on the steering wheel. However, no visual obsta-
cles caused the variation in criticality to bypass any risk 
of causing an accident for the participants. Driver interac-
tion depending on criticality seems to cause a quicker first 
reaction at the controls of the vehicle, see Fig. 4. However, 
Fig. 5  Left: time to first reaction (TTFR) for all expected yellow warning and expected red warning on Straight #9. Right: comparison of TTFR 
for all warning types and whether NDRT was played or not within 2 s prior to a take-over request (color figure online)
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this does not signify that route planning for the handling of 
the situation was quicker. The lane twitch situation in this 
study caused an acceleration to be perceived by the driver. 
Instinctive reaction to the kinaesthesia could have caused 
the quicker time to first reaction. Hypothesis 1 is therefore 
failed to be rejected, with necessary future investigations 
focusing on the causation of quicker reactions.
4.2  Warning expectancy
Two different warning types were presented in the three dif-
ferent take-over situations. The two take-over warnings con-
sisted of a yellow take control warning issued solely at the 
end of a straight and a red take control warning issued when 
system limits were met and drivers had to regain control 
immediately. These two take-over situations did not differ 
in criticality and were issued on the straights. In these situ-
ations, the system did not appear to mishandle the driving 
task; however, take-over was required (yellow and red). A 
yellow take-over warning was always presented at the end of 
a straight, allowing each participant to foresee (expect) this 
combination of situation type and warning when approach-
ing the steep curve. Solely on the last straight, the yellow 
warning was replaced with a red warning.
The comparison of the red and yellow warnings displayed 
no significant difference for TTFR. Interestingly, a highly 
significant effect for expectancy was identified for TTHoS. 
As the yellow warning could be expected at the end of the 
straights, take-over procedure could be anticipated at the end 
of the straights. This is also present in the data, as at roughly 
50% of all yellow take-over situations, the eyes were already 
focused on the road, demonstrating expectancy. The overall 
tendency of expectancy to have no effect on TTFR was also 
identified for the first and last take-overs in the experiment 
phase in which new and switched warnings were presented, 
respectively. The discrepancy between TTFR and TTHoS 
regarding expectancy can have multiple reasons. However, 
primarily only placing the hands at the steering caused the 
warning to terminate. The effect of expectancy on TTHoS 
is, therefore, anticipated. As a clear driver interaction based 
on obverting an obstacle at take-over was not necessary, the 
threshold for TTFR could have been set too high for the 
reaction to register similar to TTHoS.
An analysis of the final take-over warning at the end of 
Straight #9, which was switched from an expected yellow 
warning to a red warning, produced no significant effect for 
TTFR. However, reaction times did differ significantly in 
the yellow warning situation when hands were guiding the 
steering. A probable explanation is that some participants 
expected yellow warnings, while others trusted the automa-
tion function to warn them adequately possibly also verify-
ing the warning in the instrument cluster. With the appear-
ance of a different auditory–visual, warning was expected; 
however, the criticality was not and led to a reevaluation of 
the situation. The motoric response to unforeseeable take-
overs did not differ throughout the drives and averaged at 
0.727 s. A similar conclusion was drawn when explicitly 
investigating the hands-off times in partially automated traf-
fic jam scenarios with critical take-over situations (Naujoks 
et al. 2015). Therefore, based on the information gathered, 
Hypothesis #2 is failed to be rejected.
4.3  Comparability to simulator studies
Another research focus is to compare previously gathered 
information in a moving-base simulator to driver behavior 
in a real vehicle. Generally, current investigations in the 
Level 3 context are examined exclusively in simulators, to 
exclude the possibility of technical malfunctions or human 
error causing accidents. This is mainly because prototypes 
often are not as sophisticated as series technology and novel 
or extreme situations are investigated. While the possibili-
ties in simulated environments have excelled in recent years, 
unexpected influences might take an effect on results when 
trying to extrapolate results to a real-world context. Such 
influences could include the intrinsic trust of participants 
that no direct physical harm will occur in a simulator and the 
aspect of treating driving simulators as games (Bellem et al. 
2016). Overall, results obtained in simulators have to be vali-
dated in controlled and safe real-world scenarios to manifest 
conclusions drawn from the data. As previous experimental 
results in a truck simulator produced extremely quick TTFR 
(M = 1.35, SD = 0.49) for 755 highly time-critical take-overs 
(Lotz et al. 2019b), it was our motivation to validate these 
findings.
Results in Sect.  3 show that especially the motoric 
response time, TTHoS, was constant regardless the expected 
criticality. Learning was observed from the tutorial to the 
experimental phase, see Fig. 4. The TTFR reduced signifi-
cantly between the tutorial and experimental phase gener-
ating consistent results of learning behavior as observed 
previously (Lotz et al. 2019b). These near-constant motoric 
response times observed in the data cohere with the findings 
from Zeeb et al. (2015). Second, the different warning types 
yielded a significant effect for TTHoS in the experimental 
phase. This contradicts the results for TTFR, as only the 
most critical take-over situation generated a mildly signifi-
cant decreased reaction time. Overall, a TTFR of 1.08 s was 
observed for all take-over situations in which the hands were 
not guiding the steering wheel. A separate investigation of 
TTFR for NDRT engagement yielded no significant results.
For the consideration of reaction times in the present 
study the results of the descriptive and inferential analysis 
fail to reject Hypothesis 3 with a 3σ-interval of 0–2.343 s for 
164 take-overs, depicting 99.7% of the data. One drawback 
and possible explanation of the difference in TTFR could 
743Cognition, Technology & Work (2020) 22:733–744 
1 3
be the low torque required to take-over the vehicle in the 
yellow and red warning conditions. Only in the lane-twitch 
condition was a strong steering wheel torque required. It 
should be noted that the present study did not present highly 
time critical situations due to environmental obstacles, but 
the steering was manipulated in the lane-twitch condition 
to induce criticality as a safe option to investigate take-over 
criticality.
4.4  Non‑driving‑related tasks (NDRT)
Multiple publications investigation the effect of NDRT dur-
ing Level 3 have been published recently (Merat et al. 2012; 
Petermann-Stock et al. 2013). In the present study partici-
pants could engage in a NDRT during Level 3 automation. 
As a measure of engagement the visual attention towards the 
NDRT and tablet interaction were consulted, see Fig. 5. The 
data reported shows no significant effect of NDRT on TTFR. 
This is unexpected and leads to a rejection of Hypothesis 4. 
While the results in published research show no significant 
effects amongst different NDRT (Radlmayr et al. 2014), a 
general negative effect of tasks is documented (Vogelpohl 
et al. 2016). In the present study, participants could choose 
freely if they wanted to attend the NDRT or not. It is possi-
ble that the self-motivated engagement was, therefore, lower 
than in studies in which direct task instruction was provided.
5  Conclusion
With little experience to lean on, as no studies addressing 
a standardized procedure of investigating take-over behav-
ior in critical take-over situations exists, this study presents 
novel insights into the experimental procedure and results 
of near real-world take-over behavior for Level 3. A total of 
292 take-overs in which hands were not guiding the steering 
wheel and 64 with hands on steering were examined. The 
information gathered allows for a better understanding of 
reaction times and behavior during take-overs to expected 
and unexpected events. Ultimately, this is valuable knowl-
edge to reduce accidents in critical take-over situations 
in which the machine and humans share responsibility of 
guiding vehicles safely. For optimal data comparability, 
we would welcome a definition of take-over situations and 
measures throughout the community.
Compared to previous results, the reaction times are in 
the lower spectrum of reported reaction times (Eriksson 
et al. 2017). As argued previously, professional truck drivers 
form a unique sample as experience and training are high. 
It should be clear, however, that no driver had previously 
driven on this test track, the automation function and vehicle 
was uncommon and drivers were inclined to act safely. The 
time to first reaction (M = 1.087 s, SD = 0.417 s), time to 
hands on steering (M = 0.727 s, SD = 0.253 s) and time to 
eyes on road (M = 0.364 s, SD = 0.425 s) are most likely as 
quick as possible for the presented scenarios.
As no obstacles were manipulated in the environment 
of the vehicles at take-over, the reaction times only display 
the cognitive and motoric response times required to react 
towards a take-over signal. Resulting trajectories or displace-
ments within the lane were not investigated. Primarily due to 
short distances on the test track straights and as participants 
reactivated the automation function within 10 s, an analysis 
of take-over quality is absent. In conclusion, the collected 
reaction times present the quicker spectrum of take-over 
capability by professional truck drivers. While the limit of 
take-over reaction times cannot be much quicker, slower 
reaction times due to long automation phases, higher dis-
traction and repetition are very likely and need thorough 
investigation in the future. The reaction times here present 
the minimum time an automation function needs to span 
to assist driver take-over behavior. This still disregards if 
the driver feels comfortable with these take-over times and 
is capable of delivering this high performance over longer 
periods of time.
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